Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/04/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A025600020006-2

De File

6 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: SNIE 20-64: THE ATTITUDES OF NATO COUNTRIES TOWARD THE PROPOSED MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR

FORCE (MLF)

- 1. This estimate was requested by the White House staff, which believed that the President should have the benefit of an intelligence judgment before decisions were taken. The requesters asked that the estimate be made available before the arrival early next week of Italian President Segni and Foreign Minister Saragat.
- 2. The estimate was coordinated at the Representatives level without great difficulty. There are no reservations and thus far we know of only two points which might be queried:
 - a) INR indicated it wished to check on the statement in paragraph four that European opinion had not found the military arguments for an MLF very persuasive;
 - b) INR also appeared to have some preference for saying that Italian adherence was unlikely before mid-1964 -- rather than "before the latter part of 1964," as Conclusion B and Paragraph 31 now have it.



- 3. The estimate was prepared with the full knowledge and cooperation of the two offices in the State Department most directly concerned with the MLF project: (a) Ambassador Merchant's special staff; and (b) the Policy Planning Council. On the latter's invitation, ONE staff drafters visited the two offices to ask questions and were allowed to borrow a number of documents, including the Presidential briefing paper which presumably prompted the request for the estimate. Later, a delegation from ONE got comments from Merchant, Walt Rostow, and others on the Board draft. (The same delegation also took testimony from Dean Acheson who volunteered his observations on German attitudes.)
- 4. Merchant and Rostow thought the draft too gloomy about prospects of early Italian adherence. The central judgment on this issue is still the way they saw it.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

SHERMAN KENT Chairman